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DEBT-FOR-NATURE SWAPS: ASSESSING
THE FUTURE
Stimulating conservation while ameliorating debt would encourage
progress on both fronts.'
Environmental action adds a new dimension to the fight against
global poverty. It recognizes that sound ecology is good economics.
Indeed the objectives of sustainable economic growth, poverty alle-
viation and environmental protection are often mutually
reinforcing.2
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, approaches to solving the mounting debt problems of the
developing countries (DCs) have primarily focused on the relationships be-
tween industrial country performance and the opportunities for DCs to in-
crease exports to achieve economic growth.3  Environmental and
conservation organizations (ECOs) have, however, forcefully argued that
economic growth, without regard for environmental well-being and natural
resource conservation, will ultimately undermine the potential for long-term
sustainable growth and "increas[e] the future costs of correcting the environ-
mental destruction inflicted now." 4 In seeking solutions to their debt
problems within the conventional framework of export-led growth, DCs are
often encouraged to emphasize cash crop monocultures and intense exploita-
tion of their natural resources for short-term gain.5 These myopic schemes
1. Lovejoy, Aid Debtor Nations' Ecology, N.Y. Times, Oct. 4, 1984, at 31, col. 1.
2. Address by Barber Conable, President of the World Bank, at Meeting of the World
Resources Institute (May 5, 1987) (available from the World Bank, Washington, D.C.).
3. THE WORLD BANK, 1989 ANNUAL REPORT 26. The total external indebtedness of
the developing countries was $993.2 billion as of the end of June 1989. Id. at 30. It is cur-
rently estimated at approximately $1.3 trillion. WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE, NATURAL
ENDOWMENTS: FINANCING RESOURCE CONSERVATION FOR DEVELOPMENT 8 (Sept. 1989)
[hereinafter NATURAL ENDOWMENTS] (available from World Resources Institute, Washing-
ton, D.C.).
4. Bramble, The Debt Crisis: The Opportunities, 17 ECOLOGIST 192 (Apr./May 1987)
[hereinafter Debt Crisis]. See also Bramble, How Debt Can Be Swapped for Trees, 1-2 (May
1988) (available from the National Wildlife Federation, Washington, D.C.) [hereinafter Debt
for Trees]. See generally R. DeFries & T. Malone, Global Change and Our Common Future:
Papers from a Forum, (papers presented at the Natural Research Council's "Forum on Global
Change and Our Common Future," held May 2-3, 1989, Washington, D.C.) (available from
National Academy Press, Washington, D.C.).
5. Debt Crisis, supra note 4, at 192. A recent article notes that "[m]any Third World
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are often carried out to the detriment of existing and sometimes fragile eco-
systems, including tropical rainforests, wetlands, watersheds, and
grasslands.6
The debt crisis has presented opportunities for encouraging better envi-
ronmental management of these ecosystems and for further bolstering the
relationship between economic well-being and the environment.7 As the
market value of such debt has declined, a number of debtor DCs, especially
in Latin America, have exchanged certain amounts of debt with creditors for
equity holdings in local commercial and industrial enterprises in the debtor
DCs.' These transactions, known as "debt-for-equity" swaps, allow credi-
tors to sell foreign-denominated debt at a discounted amount of the original
face value to purchasers in the international secondary debt markets, who in
turn convert it to equity holdings in the debtor DC.9 One type of debt-for-
equity swap is that pioneered by the ECOs known as "debt-for-nature"
swaps."° Unlike debt-for-equity swaps, purchasers in debt-for-nature swaps
do not take title to an asset. These transactions involve private banks selling
amounts of debt owed to them by DCs to private ECOs. The ECOs then
forgive the debt in return for specific environmental commitments, such as
conserving a particular tropical rainforest or wetlands area and providing for
countries depend greatly for their development prospects on the natural resource base... that
sustains much of their economic activity. For instance, in Central America about one-fourth
of gross domestic product is based on natural resources; these resources also account for more
than one-half of all employment and for most export earnings." Meyers, Environment and
Security, 74 FOREIGN POL'Y 23, 24 (Spr. 1989) (emphasis added). See also Aufderheide &
Rich, Environmental Reform and the Multilateral Banks, 5 WORLD POL'Y J. 301, 302 (Spr.
1988) [hereinafter Aufderheide & Rich].
6. Debt Crisis, supra note 4, at 192.
7. Aufderheide & Rich, supra note 5, at 320; Wirth, Climate Chaos, 74 FOREIGN POL'Y
3, 20 (Spr. 1989) [hereinafter Wirth].
8. THE WORLD BANK, 1988 ANNUAL REPORT 27.
9. Id. In a debt-for-equity transaction, a foreign company, usually working through an
intermediary bank, proposes a debt-for-equity transaction with the debtor country's govern-
ment. Once officially approved, the company purchases portions of the country's debt, through
the intermediary bank in the international secondary debt market at a substantial discount.
The company subsequently presents the debt instrument to the debtor country's central bank
for redemption in local currency (greater than the amount paid for the original debt instru-
ment, sometimes as much as face value) at the official exchange rate. The debt is officially
retired and the company uses the local currency to make an equity investment in the debtor
country. Note, International Debt: Debt-to-Equity Swaps, 28 HARV. INT'L L.J. 507 (1987).
See also Blackwell & Nocera, The Impact of Debt to Equity Conversion, 25 FIN. & DEV. 15
(June 1988) (available from the World Bank, Washington, D.C.). The international secondary
debt market developed "so that banks could swap loans among themselves, thereby avoiding
overexposure to any single troubled economy," but came increasingly to be used for swapping
debt for equity by commercial investors. Debt for Trees, supra note 4, at 2. See also Weinert,
Swapping Third World Debt, 65 FOREIGN AFF. 85 (Winter 1986-87).
10. Debt for Trees, supra note 4, at 3.
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its maintenance with local currencies made available by the debt
forgiveness. 1
This Comment focuses on two aspects of this type of environmental initia-
tive. First, this Comment will examine debt-for-equity transactions known
as "debt-for-nature" swaps to see what is involved in carrying out such a
transaction and what such swaps have accomplished to date. Second, the
Comment will assess what future, if any, such transactions may have in re-
ducing the overall debt of the DCs and in enhancing their environments.
The purpose is to discern what measure of viability such debt-for-nature
transactions have achieved as debt relief mechanisms and what success they
have had in establishing linkages between conservation of natural resources
and achieving long-term sustainable development in DCs.
In order to fully assess the viability of debt-for-nature swaps, the Com-
ment will first examine the general nature of this complex transaction to see
how debt is exchanged for nature. Second, it will provide a brief overview of
the debt-for-nature swaps that have been arranged to date, identifying the
parties involved in the transaction and describing what was accomplished.
Finally, this Comment will explore the future of such swaps and their role in
debt relief and in enhancing sustainable growth.
I. WHAT IS A DEBT-FOR-NATURE SWAP
A. Overview
Arranging a debt-for-nature swap is a complicated and technical financial
transaction involving a number of variables. Although each debt-for-nature
swap arranged to date differs in certain respects, there are common charac-
teristics. Generally, the typical debt-for-nature swap involves a five-step
process. The first step involves the sponsoring ECO (located in the United
States or Europe) obtaining approval from the debtor country. Specifically
this entails gaining the approval of the three main actors involved: the gov-
ernment, the central bank, and perhaps most important, a private ECO. The
debtor country ECO will receive the funds and manage the resulting conser-
vation program. Arguably, the sponsoring ECO is in the most difficult posi-
tion, as it must not only relinquish effective control over the funds in order
to avoid "sovereignty" questions, 2 but also must act as guarantor for the
continued responsible use of such funds to domestic donors and tax
authorities. 3
11. Wirth, supra note 7, at 20; see also Hansen, Debt for Nature Swaps - Overview and
Discussion of Key Issues, I ECOLOGICAL ECON. 77, 78 (Feb. 1989) [hereinafter Hansen].
12. See infra notes 119-22 and accompanying text.
13. von Moltke, Debt for Nature: An Overview, at 1 [hereinafter von Moltke] in NA-
1990]
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A wide range of issues may be raised in negotiations with the debtor coun-
try's government, including setting the exchange rate used in converting the
debt into local currency and designating a local agent to control the funds
and dispense the proceeds.14 In addition, the agreed upon conservation pro-
gram is designed to address local priorities, and therefore may include spe-
cific projects or more general environmental and conservation objectives."
The second step in the transaction involves identifying and acquiring the
debt instrument. The sponsoring ECO literally shops for the best available
denomination debt notes that are acceptable to the debtor country. Typi-
cally, an ECO either buys or receives as a donation the external debt of a
DC. The debt may be purchased in the international secondary debt market
where prices range from a few cents on the dollar to parity. The price serves
as an indicator of risk - the closer to parity the less risk involved. 6 The
money needed to acquire the debt can be raised either through traditional
fundraising techniques or may be donated outright. Outright donation of
the debt presents a new and otherwise inaccessible source of funds to the
sponsoring ECO.'7 Other options include "sale at a preferential price or
donation of cash" for purchase of the debt on the market; the choice is often
dictated by the tax status of the parties.18
The third step, transfer of the title to the debt, is often the most complex.
Three principal methods of debt transfer have arisen out of debt-for-nature
transactions negotiated to date. The method chosen has usually been dic-
tated by financial and tax-related factors, and in some instances accounting
considerations. Methods of debt transfer include: (1) the acquisition of the
debt by the sponsoring ECO in the creditor country, which in turn donates it
to its partner ECO in the debtor DC; (2) the donation of the necessary re-
sources to the partner ECO allowing direct acquisition of the debt; and (3)
TIONAL WILDLIFE FEDERATION/WORLD WILDLIFE FUND, DEBT FOR NATURE: AN OPPOR-
TUNITY (1989) (available from either National Wildlife Federation, Washington, D.C. or
World Wildlife Fund, Washington, D.C.).
14. von Moltke, supra note 13, at 1. See also Debt-for Nature Swaps.- A New Conservation
Tool, 1 WORLD WILDLIFE FUND LETTER 8 (1988) [hereinafter WORLDLIFE FUND LETTER].
15. 1 WORLD WILDLIFE FUND LETTER, supra note 14, at 8.
16. The debtor country retains effective control over approval of such transactions be-
cause the debt cannot be freely disposed of in these markets by the bank due to covenants
entered with debtor countries in the course of debt rescheduling negotiations. von Moltke,
supra note 13, at 1-2. The price of the debt depends on the buyer's and the seller's opinion of
its value, which, in turn, depends on a number of variables, including its likelihood of repay-
ment and its value in any debt-equity swap. U.S. Accounting: A Summary, in NATIONAL
WILDLIFE FEDERATION/WORLD WILDLIFE FUND, DEBT FOR NATURE: AN OPPORTUNITY
(1989) (available from either National Wildlife Federation, Washington, D.C. or World Wild-
life Fund, Washington, D.C.).
17. von Moltke, supra note 13, at 2.
18. Id.
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finally, donation of the debt directly to the partner ECO, which acts as the
creditor country's agent. 19 The fourth step entails the actual conversion by
the debtor DC's central bank of the acquired debt into a local currency in-
strument, i.e., local currency bonds, measures to protect designated areas,
cash payment of local currency, or some combination of the above.20
The fifth and final step - the actual objective of the swap - is the imple-
mentation of the conservation program. Again, the creditor country or
sponsoring ECO may have the most at stake, since it is required to not only
relinquish effective control of the funds, thereby placing them at risk, but
must also assure donors and tax authorities that these funds will be used
properly and in accordance with the agreement. 2I
B. Debt-for-Nature Swaps Negotiated to Date
Several factors combined in late 1986 and in 1987 to provide a conducive
atmosphere for the first debt-for-nature swaps. One major factor was that a
growing number of commercial banks began to conclude that large portions
of their debt portfolios, especially in Latin America, were uncollectible. This
conclusion led the banks to "write-down" or sell high-risk debts at consider-
able discounts, thereby increasing activity in the international secondary
debt market. 22 In addition, many DCs undertook debt-for-equity transac-
tions, redeeming portions of their debt in local currency by allowing debt-
holders to take equity interests in commercial and industrial enterprises.23
Indeed, the initial "debt-for-nature" opportunities emerged from the debt-
for-equity concept as debtor countries and private lenders became frustrated
by the failure of conventional mechanisms to alleviate the mounting debt
crisis, and, as a result, began to consider unconventional solutions.24
The United States Treasury Department provided further impetus for un-
dertaking such transactions in issuing a favorable revenue ruling in Novem-
ber 1987.25 The ruling essentially clarified the tax treatment of possible
19. Id. Hansen notes that at least four different debt-for-nature swap schemes have been
proposed: (1) conversion of debt by the Central Bank into local currency or local debt bonds to
be held by the local ECO; (2) donation of debt to a local ECO for investment in environmental
projects; (3) purchase of debt by an ECO and discounted sale to a multinational corporation to
support environmentally sound investments; and (4) official debt relief tied to supporting envi-
ronmental management. Hansen, supra note 11, at 78.
20. von Moltke, supra note 13, at 2.
21. Id.
22. See Weinert, Swapping Third World Debt, 65 FOREIGN AFF. 85 (Winter 1986-87).
23. Debt for Trees, supra note 4, at 2.
24. Fuller & Williamson, Debt for Nature Swaps: A New Means of Funding Conservation
in Developing Nations, Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 301 (May 11, 1988) [hereinafter Fuller &
Williamson].
25. Rev. Rul. 87-124, 1987-2 C.B. 205. See also Banks Are Offered Way to Write Off
1990]
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gains and losses arising from conversion of debt to equity, as well as dona-
tions of debt instruments to charitable organizations for environmental or
other social purposes in DCs. The ruling permits lenders that donate debt to
ECOs to take a tax deduction equal to their cost basis in the debt.26 Prior to
issuance of the ruling, tax laws limited the charitable deduction to the mar-
Third World Loans, Wall St. J., Nov. 19, 1987, at 44, col. 3. Prior to the issuance of this
ruling, the ECOs had been pursuing legislative solutions. The ECOs welcomed this ruling, but
were concerned as to whether the ruling would apply in particular debt transactions or coun-
tries then under consideration. The Treasury Department effectively addressed these issues in
an April 1988 interpretive ruling, enhancing debt-for-nature transaction possibilities and elimi-
nating the need for specific legislation. See 1 WORLD WILDLIFE FUND LETTER supra note 14,
at 8. See also Fuller & Williamson, supra note 24, at 303.
With regard to legislation concerning debt-for-nature swaps, to date three measures have
been passed into law. The first of these was the 1987 Continuing Resolution, Pub; L. No. 100-
202 § 537, 1987 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (101 Stat.) 1329 which contained lan-
guage directing the Treasury Department to promote environmentally sustainable economic
growth through the multilateral development banks and to report to Congress on debt reduc-
tion initiatives involving conservation activities. An April 1988 Treasury report stated that
debt-for-nature swaps directly involving these institutions could not be a part of the "menu" of
options because loans from these institutions were not "saleable in the secondary markets,
cannot be converted to grants for environmental purposes, and are not reschedulable." The
report did, however, recommend a number of initiatives, including a debt-for-nature pilot pro-
ject to increase the World Bank's technical assistance and support role in debt-for-nature
transactions and conservation programs in general. The second piece of legislation was the
Foreign Operations Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriation Act 1989 (Pub.
L. No. 100-461, 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (102 Stat.) 2268), which referenced
language exhorting the World Bank and the African Development Bank to expand their advi-
sory roles and encourage debt-for-development swaps for "human welfare and environmental
conservation." See Cody, Debt-for-Nature Swaps in Developing Countries: An Overview of Re-
cent Conservation Efforts, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Rept. No. 88-
647, 24-26 (Sept. 26, 1988). The third piece of legislation was the International Development
and Finance Act of 1989 (Pub. L. No. 101-240, 1989 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (103
Stat.) 2492) which, inter alia, (1) authorized the Agency for International Development to
make grants to non-governmental organizations for use in debt-for-nature swaps in DCs, (2)
established a pilot program of debt-for-nature exchanges focusing on sustainable agriculture
for sub-Saharan Africa, (3) encourages the Secretaries of State and Treasury to make global
warming and other environmental factors a priority in U.S. bilateral and multilateral assist-
ance programs, and (4) requires the Secretary of Treasury to include support for conservation
and sustainable development in debt reduction programs. Id.
26. It specifically provides that if a commercial bank exchanges a debt obligation of a
foreign country's central bank and those funds are credited to the account of a U.S. charitable
organization for charitable purposes in the foreign country, "the bank will (i) recognize a loss
equal to the difference between its cost basis in the debt and the debt's fair market value, and
(ii) be entitled to a charitable deduction equal to the fair market value of the local currency."
Hyde, U.S. Taxes: The Issues, 1-2, in NATIONAL WILDLIFE FEDERATION/WORLD WILDLIFE
FUND, DEBT FOR NATURE: AN OPPORTUNITY (1989) (available from either National Wildlife
Federation, Washington D.C. or World Wildlife Fund, Washington, D.C.). See also CONSER-
VATION INTERNATIONAL, THE DEBT-FOR NATURE EXCHANGE: A TOOL FOR INTERNA-
TIONAL CONSERVATION, 24-25 (Sept. 1989) [hereinafter DfN Exchange] (available from
Conservation International, Washington, D.C.).
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ket value of the loan when such value was below the cost basis of the loan, 27
as is the case with many of the loans to the DCs. Thus, if a lender donated
such debt to an ECO, it would be unable to recover its entire basis through
the charitable deduction. Doing so would place the lender in a worse posi-
tion than if it sold the debt and donated the proceeds to charity. The ruling
rectified this situation by placing the lender in the same position regardless
of whether the debt is donated, or sold and the proceeds donated.
While the ruling alleviated certain problems associated with these transac-
tions, questions of how to value both the loan loss and the charitable contri-
bution deductions were left unanswered.2" This situation, combined with
the general lack of financial incentives and banks' traditional reluctance to
donate assets, has produced a marked lack of response by the banks.29 To
date only two banks have donated portions of their debt to U.S. ECOs.3°
Despite the general skepticism of the banking community regarding debt-
for-nature swaps, nine such swaps have taken place to date in six countries:
Bolivia, Ecuador, Costa Rica, the Philippines, Madagascar and Zambia. A
summary of these transactions follows.
27. Generally, the amount of the deduction for a charitable contribution of property to a
§ 501(c) (3) organization is the fair market value of the property at the time of the contribu-
tion. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A l(c) (1988). In the case of a sale of ordinary income producing
property, such as DC debt held by a commercial bank, the amount of deduction is reduced by
the amount of ordinary income realized, thus limiting the deduction to the donor's adjusted
cost basis. I.R.C. § 170(e) (1988).
28. See DfN Exchange, supra note 26, at 25 & n. 14. The related question of whether such
deductions are to be counted against foreign source or domestic source income was addressed
in late April, 1989. The IRS issued a notice which provided that charitable contributions may
generally be taken against domestic source income, while loan loss deductions are to be appor-
tioned between domestic source and foreign source income. I.R.S. Notice 89-58, 1989-1 C.B.
699.
29. DfN Exchange, supra note 26, at 25.
30. It was earlier believed that Fleet National Bank had used this revenue ruling to donate
its debt to The Nature Conservancy in its debt-for-nature transaction with Costa Rica. Cody,
Debt-for-Nature Swaps: A Brief Overview, Congressional Research Service, Library of Con-
gress, Rep. No. 88-489, 4 (July 12, 1988). However, in a later report, Cody notes that accord-
ing to William Penn, senior vice president for Fleet, uncertainty surrounding the IRS ruling
led Fleet to write the donation off as a loss, instead of treating it as a charitable donation.
Cody, Debt-for-Nature Swaps in Developing Countries: An Overview of Recent Conservation Ef-
forts, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Rep. No. 88-647, 15 n.25 (Sept. 26,
1988); see also DIN Exchange, supra note 26, at 25-26. In December 1988, an affiliate of Chase
Manhattan Bank donated approximately $400,000 of Bolivian debt to Conservation Interna-
tional, but again, tax benefits did not appear to be the primary motivation behind the donation.
Id. Also in December of 1988, Midland Bank, PLC, in the first donation of debt by a British
bank, donated $800,000 of Sudanese debt to UNICEF, which exchanged the debt for an undis-
closed amount of local currency to finance a rural water purification project. Id. at 25 n.16
(citing Thirst Quencher, ECONOMIST, Dec. 24, 1988, at 87.).
1990]
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1. Bolivia / Conservation International
In the first negotiated debt-for-nature swap, Conservation International, a
Washington, D.C. ECO, purchased $650,000 of Bolivia's commercial bank
debt to finance and ensure protective management of over four million acres
of tropical forests and grasslands.3 Citicorp Investment Bank acted as Con-
servation International's agent in the international secondary debt market.32
The debt was purchased at approximately an eighty-five percent discount of
its face value. 33  In addition, the Frank Weeden Foundation provided a
$100,000 grant to finance this transaction.34
The terms of the agreement, signed July 13, 1987, provided that in return
for cancellation of Bolivia's obligation to pay the $650,000 debt, Bolivia
would give maximum legal protection to the Beni Biosphere Reserve and
increase to 3.7 million acres the protected areas abutting the reserve. 35 Bo-
livia also agreed to establish a local currency operating fund totaling
$250,000 to manage the reserve and the protected areas. 36 The reserve, lo-
cated in northeastern Bolivia, supports thirteen endangered species, five hun-
dred species of birds, and the nomadic Chimane Indians. a7 Management of
the reserve will emphasize using the forests and grasslands in a sustainable
manner to benefit all regional peoples, thus protecting the ecosystem and
preserving the traditional lifestyle of the Chimane. 3' Because the reserve
31. Agreement Between The Government of Bolivia and Conservation International, cls.
3 & 10, July 13, 1987, Bolivia-Conservation International, at 3, 5 [hereinafter Bolivia Agree-
ment] (available from Conservation International, Washington, D.C.); Conservation Interna-
tional, News Release, Bolivia Sets Precedent With First Ever "Debt for Nature" Swap (July 13,
1987), at 1 [hereinafter Bolivia Sets Precedent] (available from Conservation International,
Washington, D.C.); see also The Bolivia Case, in NATIONAL WILDLIFE FEDERATION/WORLD
WILDLIFE FUND, DEBT FOR NATURE: AN OPPORTUNITY [hereinafter The Bolivia Case]
(available from either National Wildlife Federation, Washington, D.C. or World Wildlife Fed-
eration, Washington, D.C.); Truell, What Do Monkeys in Bolivia Have to Do With the Debt
Crisis?, Wall St. J., Jan. 20, 1988, at 1, col. 4.
32. Bolivia Agreement, supra note 31, at cl. 3; Bolivia Sets Precendent, supra note 31, at 1.
33. The Bolivia Case, supra note 31.
34. Id.
35. Id. See also Bolivia Sets Precedent, supra note 31, at 2.
36. Bolivia Agreement, supra note 31, at cl. 11; The Bolivia Case, supra note 31.
37. The Bolivia Case, supra note at 31; Conservation International, Fact Sheet, Bolivia's
Beni Biosphere Reserve (1987) (available from Conservation International, Washington, D.C.).
38. But see Collett, Bolivia Blazes Trail ... to Where?, Christian Sci. Monitor, July 10,
1989, at 4. Chimane and Moxo Indian leaders claim that conservation measures are being
subordinated to commercial logging interests. Under the terms of the debt swap, Conservation
International agreed to assist the government of Costa Rica in supervising logging efforts in
the Chimanes Permanent Forest, the largest of three areas comprising a buffer zone around the
Beni Biosphere Reserve. These logging efforts, and additional logging concessions granted by
the government just prior to implementing the debt-for-nature swap, were implemented with-
out consulting the Indian tribes. These concessions conflict with existing uses of the forest area
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remained under the control of the Bolivian government, "sovereignty" issues
and accusations of foreign intervention were essentially avoided.3 9
Responsibility for carrying out these environmental programs rests with a
national commission composed of local officials of the Beni region, scientists
from the Ecology Institute and the Beni Biological Station, and a representa-
tive from the environmental coalition Liga de Defensa del Medio Ambiente
(LIDEMA). 4 Administration of the operating fund rests jointly with the
Bolivian Ministry of Agriculture and the national commission.
4 1
2. Ecuador
a. World Wildlife Fund
In an agreement signed December 14, 1987, World Wildlife Fund ar-
ranged to purchase one million dollars in debt from the Central Bank of
Ecuador for $354,000 to be converted to nine-year local currency bonds.42
The bonds will finance a broad range of conservation activities in Ecuador's
national parks by Fundacion Natura, a leading Ecuadorian conservation
group.
43
The Ecuadorian government issued the bonds at the full amount of the
debt note which were converted to the local currency, sucres, at the official
exchange rate.' The principal will become an endowment for Fundacion
Natura, while the interest generated by the bonds will pay for a variety of
programs, including management plans for protected areas, development of
park infrastructure, acquisition of small nature reserves, training of park
personnel, and environmental education activities. 45 In addition, Fundacion
Natura will act as a conduit to support the efforts of other private conserva-
by the semi-nomadic tribes, who also fear further encroachment by settlers via the roads built
by the logging concerns. Conservation International has apparently been the recipient of funds
from the logging interests, in particular the International Timber Trade Organization, a Japa-
nese-based organization, and has sided with the government of Costa Rica in opposing the
tribes' desires to establish integrated tribal areas in the region. Id.
39. The Bolivia Case, supra note 31.
40. Id.
41. Id. Bolivia Agreement, supra note 31, at cl. 11.
42. Debt-for-Nature Agreement & Attachment, Dec. 14, 1987, Fundacion Natura-World
Wildlife Fund [hereinafter Ecuador Agreement] (available from World Wildlife Fund, Wash-
ington, D.C.); The Ecuadoran Case, in NATIONAL WILDLIFE FEDERATION/WORLD WILD-
LIFE FUND: AN OPPORTUNITY (1989) (hereinafter The Ecuadoran Case] (available from
either National Wildlife Federation, Washington, D.C. or World Wildlife Fund, Washington,
D.C.).
43. Ecuador Agreement, supra note 42, at §§ 1 & 2; The Ecuadoran Case, supra note 42;
Fuller & Williamson, supra note 24, at 302.
44. Ecuador Agreement, supra note 42, at § 1; The Ecuadoran Case, supra note 42.
45. Ecuador Agreement, supra note 42, at §§ 1 & 2; The Ecuadoran Case, supra note 42;
see also Fuller & Williamson, supra note 24, at 302.
1990]
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tion groups.46
b. World Wildlife Fund, The Nature Conservancy & Missouri
Botanical Garden
In the second debt-for-nature swap with Ecuador, World Wildlife Fund,
The Nature Conservancy and Missouri Botanical Garden collaborated to
purchase a total of nine million dollars of debt from American Express Bank
and Morgan Guaranty Trust Company.47 The debt will be converted on a
one-to-one basis into nine million dollars worth of eight-year local currency
bonds. This transaction was initiated by Fundacion Natura, the lead conser-
vation organization in Ecuador's first debt-for-nature transaction. 48
Using the interest generated by the bonds, Fundacion Natura will fund
park acquisition and management projects in the Andes, the Ecuadorian
Amazon region, and the Galapagos Islands.49 In addition, the interest will
also fund local training of conservation professionals and the creation of a
conservation data base for the collection and storage of information concern-
ing Ecuador's biological diversity that will allow for more scientifically accu-
rate conservation and development planning.5°
World Wildlife Fund will purchase $5.4 million of the debt package from
Morgan Guaranty Trust Company, and The Nature Conservancy will
purchase $3.6 million of the debt from American Express Bank, including
$400,000 purchased on behalf of the Missouri Botanical Garden. The entire
debt package cost $1.069 million.51
3. Costa Rica
a. The Nature Conservancy & World Wildlife Fund
In the second largest of the debt-for-nature swaps to date, the Costa Rican
government agreed to a debt exchange program allowing the pooling of
46. Ecuador Agreement, supra note 42, at §§ 2(b) & 3; Ecuadoran Case, supra note 42.
47. The Debt-for-Nature Agreement, March 22, 1989, The Nature Conservancy-Funda-
cion Natura, §§ 1 & 2 [hereinafter Ecuador] (available from The Nature Conservancy, Wash-
ington, D.C.); The Nature Conservancy, News, U.S. Conservation Groups and Banks
Collaborate on Mammoth $9 Million Ecuadorian Debt-for-Nature Swap, at 1-2 (Apr. 5, 1989)
[hereinafter TNC News] (available from The Nature Conservancy, Washington, D.C. See also
The Ecuadoran Case, in NATIONAL WILDLIFE FEDERATION/WORLD WILDLIFE FUND, AN
OPPORTUNITY (1989) (available from either National Wildlife Federation, Washington, D.C.
or World Wildlife Fund, Washington, D.C.).
48. Ecuador, supra note 47, at Preliminary Statement & § 1. Weisskopf, Ecuador Gets
Aidfor Debt, Environment, Wash. Post, Apr. 6, 1989, at A20, col. 2.
49. Ecuador, supra note 47, at § 2. See also TNC News, supra note 47, at 2.
50. TNC News, supra note 47, at 2.
51. TNC News, supra note 47, at 2-3.
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funds from debt donors to finance a broad spectrum of environmental pro-
grams. 52 The agreement, signed March 4, 1988, permitted the purchase of
up to $5.4 million (the government has recently agreed to allow possibly as
much as $55.4 million)53 in Costa Rican external debt for $891,000 from the
American Express Bank and Bankers Trust.54 The debt will be exchanged
for local currency bonds, the proceeds of which will be used to establish a
Costa Rican National Resources Conservation Fund. Fundacion de Parques
Nacionales, a leading Costa Rican conservation organization, will adminis-
ter the Fund.55
Many lending institutions provided the debt notes for the swap, including
Fleet National Bank of Rhode Island (part of the Fleet/Norstar Financial
Group, Inc.), which donated $254,000 of Costa Rican debt to The Nature
Conservancy. This donation made Fleet the first U.S. financial institution to
donate outright a portion of the foreign debt it holds for charitable pur-
poses.56 Pooled funds to purchase the debt were provided by a number of
ECOs and charitable foundations.57
The Costa Rican debt was purchased at approximately an eighty percent
discount and was exchanged for bonds offered at seventy-five percent of face
52. The Costa Rican Case, in NATIONAL WILDLIFE FEDERATION/WORLD WILDLIFE
FUND, DEBT FOR NATURE: AN OPPORTUNITY (1989) (available from either National Wildlife
Federation, Washington, D.C. or World Wildlife Fund, Washington, D.C.).
53. A Debt-for-Nature Swap In Costa Rica Biggest Yet, Wall St. J., Jan. 13, 1989, at 8, col.
1. Conservation International has reported that the government of Costa Rica is currently
contemplating another debt exchange program totalling approximately $45 million. DfN Ex-
change, supra note 26, at 16 n.9.
54. Debt-for-Nature Agreement & Attachment, Preliminary Statement 4, March 4, 1988,
World Wildlife Fund-U.S.-Costa Rican Ministry of Natural Resources-Fundacion de Parques
Nacionales, at 1 [hereinafter Costa Rica Agreement] (available from either The Nature Con-
servancy, Washington, D.C. or World Wildlife Fund, Washington, D.C.); The Nature Conser-
vancy, Facts, U.S. Debt-for-Nature Swaps to Date (Apr. 4, 1989) (available from The Nature
Conservancy, Washington, D.C.); The Costa Rica Case, in NATIONAL WILDLIFE FEDERA-
TION/WORLD WILDLIFE FUND, DEBT FOR NATURE: AN OPPORTUNITY (1989) [hereinafter
The Costa Rican Case] (available from either National Wildlife Federation, Washington, D.C.
or World Wildlife Fund, Washington, D.C.). See also Sun, Costa Rica's Campaign for Conser-
vation, 239 SCIENCE 1366-69 (Mar. 18, 1988); Umana, Costa Rica Swaps Debtfor Trees, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 6, 1987, at 31, col. 4.
55. Costa Rica Agreement, supra note 54, at Preliminary Statement 4 & § 1; The Costa
Rican Case, supra note 54.
56. The Costa Rican Case, supra note 54; Sun, Costa Rica's Campaign for Conservation,
239 SCIENCE 1366, 1367 (Mar. 18, 1988); see also supra note 30 and accompanying text.
57. These included The Nature Conservancy, World Wildlife Fund, Associacion Eco-
logica La Pacifica, the Pew Charitable Trust, the MacArthur Foundation, the J.S. Noyes
Foundation, the Swedish Society for the Conservation of Nature, the W. Alton Jones Founda-
tion, the Organization for Tropical Studies, and Conservation International. ECOs entering
into debt swap agreements with Costa Rica may specify particular projects they wish to fund.
The Costa Rican Case, supra note 54; DiN Exchange, supra note 26, at 15.
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value carrying an average of twenty-five percent interest. 5s Because the
bonds cannot be immediately sold under the arrangement, only the interest
payments are immediately available for environmental projects.
The National Resources Conservation Fund will be used to acquire addi-
tional property for "wildlands" protection, as well as to manage and protect
existing parklands. 9 In addition, the Fund will finance environmental edu-
cation and conservation training programs and other activities related to de-
veloping the sustainable use of natural resources, including reforestation,
and innovative work with local populations to prevent deforestation. One of
the most important recipients of these funds will be the Guanacaste National
Park Project, which involves the purchase of land located between existing
parks and reserves to allow the restoration of a dry tropical forest.'
b. Conservation International
In a second debt-for-nature transaction with Costa Rica, Conservation In-
ternational transferred $50,000 to the Fundacion de Parques Nacionales.6"
These funds will be used to purchase $215,000 of Costa Rican debt.62 This
$215,000 will be paid in monetary stabilization bonds, which in turn will be
placed in the National Resources Conservation Fund.6 3 Interest generated
by these bonds will be earmarked to finance resource conservation and devel-
opment in Costa Rica's La Amistad Biosphere Reserve.'
The La Amistad Biosphere Reserve, designated in 1982, contains two na-
tional parks, two biological reserves and five indigenous reserves occupied by
two distinct cultures, the Bribri and the Cabecar. The 612,000 hectare (ap-
prox. 1.5 million acres) reserve encompasses a variety of plant communities,
ranging from premontane rainforest up through cloud forest and temperate
oak woods to alpine meadow scrub. 65 Animal life is diverse; rare and endan-
gered mammals inhabiting the reserve include all six tropical cat species, the
giant anteater, and the tapir, as well as over four hundred species of birds.66
58. The Costa Rican Case, supra note 54.
59. Costa Rica Agreement, supra note 54, at Attachment.
60. Costa Rica Agreement, supra note 54, at Attachment & § 2.
61. Embassy of Costa Rica, News Release, Conservation International Makes Creative In-
vestment in Costa Rica's La Amistad Biosphere Reserve (Apr. 25, 1988) [hereinafter Costa Rica
News Release] (available from Conservation International, Washington, D.C.).
62. The transaction takes into account the rate at which Costa Rican debt was then selling
(17 cents/$1) and a twenty-five percent redemption fee being charged by the Central Bank of
Costa Rica. Costa Rica News Release, supra note 61, at 2.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1-2.
65. Conservation International, Fact Sheet, La Amistad Biosphere Reserve - Characteris-
tics, at 1-2 (Mar. 1988) (available from Conservation International, Washington, D.C.).
66. Id.
Debt-for-Nature Swaps
c. The Nature Conservancy
On January 12, 1989, The Nature Conservancy announced that it had
concluded the largest private debt-for-nature swap to date with the govern-
ment of Costa Rica.67 The transaction involved the purchase of $5.6 million
of discounted Costa Rican debt for $784,000 from American Express Bank,
a subsidiary of American Express Company.68 The debt, totaling over $1.7
million under the renegotiated terms, will be converted to Costa Rican cur-
rency bonds which, at an average annual interest of twenty-five percent over
five years, are expected to generate over $3 million for vital conservation
projects. 69 Projects to be funded include park protection, conservation train-
ing, educational programs, biological inventories, and land acquisition at
nine parks or reserves in Costa Rica encompassing over 355,000 acres.
70
The transaction was initiated by the Fundacion de Parques Nacionales
and authorized by the Costa Rican Natural Resources Ministry and the
Central Bank. 7' The American Express Bank provided valuable technical
assistance and has agreed to assist and advise The Nature Conservancy on
future debt-for-nature transactions.72 The Nature Conservancy received ad-
ditional assistance in this transaction from the Stroud Foundation; the Mac-
Arthur Foundation; the J.S. Noyes Foundation; the W. Alton Jones
Foundation; The World Wildlife Fund; the government of the Nether-
lands; 73 the Swedish Society for the Conservation of Nature; and the Peo-
ple's Trust for Endangered Species based in the United Kingdom.74
67. The Nature Conservancy, News Release, Nature Conservancy Concludes Largest Pri-
vate Debt-for-Nature Swap, at 1 (Jan. 12, 1989) [hereinafter TNC News Release] (available
from The Nature Conservancy, Washington, D.C.); see also A Debt-for-Nature Swap in Costa
Rica Biggest Yet, Wall St. J., Jan. 13, 1989, at 8, col. 1.
68. TNC News Release, supra note 67, at 1.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 2.
71. Id. at 1.
72. Id. at 2.
73. Although not much is known concerning the details of the transactions, Costa Rica
has recently entered into debt-for-nature swaps with the governments of The Netherlands and
Sweden. DfN Exchange, supra note 26, at 16. Within the context of its bilateral aid program
with Costa Rica, the government of The Netherlands will exchange over $30 million of com-
mercial bank debt for local currency bonds equalling 33% of the principal amount of the debt.
Proceeds generated by the bonds will finance various reforestation projects in Costa Rica. Id.
The government of Sweden has also negotiated a debt-for-nature swap, purchasing approxi-
mately $25 million of commercial bank debt, also to be exchanged for local currency bonds
equalling 70% of the principal amount of the exchanged debt. Proceeds will fund the comple-
tion and endowment of the Guanacaste National Park. Id. & n.8.
74. TNC News Release, supra note 67, at 3.
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4. Philippines / World Wildlife Fund
In the first example of a debt-for-nature swap in Asia, World Wildlife
Fund signed an agreement with the Philippine government on June 24, 1988,
allowing it to acquire up to two million dollars in Philippine debt.75 Ini-
tially, World Wildlife Fund will acquire debt worth $390,000 at a discount
of fifty-five percent of face value, which will be converted by the central bank
to a local currency account managed by the Haribon Foundation, a leading
Philippine ECO.76 The participation of other ECO or donor agencies is en-
couraged by the agreement.77
Initial funds made available by this transaction will benefit two parks on
Palawan Island, the St. Paul Subterranean River National Park, which in-
cludes an underground river and caverns as well as mountain forests and
coastal areas, and El Nido National Marine Park, which encompasses reefs
surrounding smaller islands off the northwest tip of Palawan.78 Projects to
be funded include management plans, buffer zone acquisitions, research and
environmental education activities, training for local community resource
managers, and fellowships for graduate students in conservation-related ar-
eas. 79 Funds will also be used to aid the government's efforts to halt illegal
trading and exploitation of wildlife resources, survey critical areas, and plan
for an integrated system of protected areas.80 Use of the funds is restricted
only in that they cannot be used to pay non-Philippine consultants and must
be devoted to national projects.81
5. Madagascar / World Wildlife Fund
World Wildlife Fund announced August 3, 1989, that it had signed a
debt-for-nature agreement with the Central Bank of Madagascar, the first in
Africa, which would allow for an exchange of up to three million dollars of
75. Debt-for-Nature Agreement, Preliminary Statement (3) § 1, June 24, 1988, World
Wildlife Fund-U.S. - Department of Environment & Natural Resources of the Republic of
the Philippines - Haribon Foundation, at 1 [hereinafter Philippines Agreement] (available
from World Wildlife Fund, Washington, D.C.); World Wildlife Fund, News Release, World
Wildlife Fund Commits Up to $2 Million to Philippines for Conservation, at 1 (June 23, 1988)
[hereinafter WWF News Release] (available from World Wildlife Fund, Washington, D.C.);
The Phillipines Case, in NATIONAL WILDLIFE FEDERATION/WORLD WILDLIFE FUND, DEBT
FOR NATURE: AN OPPORTUNITY (1989) [hereinafter The Phillipines Case] (available from
either National Wildlife Federation, Washington, D.C. or World Wildlife Fund, Washington,
D.C.).
76. WWF News Release, supra note 75, at 3; The Philippines Case, supra note 75.
77. Philippines Agreement, supra note 75, at § 3.
78. WWF News Release, supra note 75, at 2;. The Philippines Case, supra note 75.
79. Philippines Agreement, supra note 75, at § 2(a); The Philippines Case, supra note 75.
80. The Philippines Case, supra note 75.
81. Philippines Agreement, supra note 75, at § 2(b).
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Malagasy debt at one hundred percent of its principal amount over tle next
two years.82 World Wildlife Fund has actively supported conservation ef-
forts in Madagascar for over twenty-four years."3 Even more importantly,
the U.S. Government, through the Agency for International Development
(AID), will provide substantial financial support, possibly as much as one
million dollars of the transaction's total funding costs.84 Bankers Trust
Company, which had previously assisted World Wildlife Fund in its debt-
for-nature swaps in Ecuador and the Philippines, arranged a European syn-
dicate of seven commercial banks to participate in the transaction. 5
World Wildlife Fund will initially use $950,000 to redeem approximately
$2.1 million in Malagasy debt, at a rate of 45 cents on the dollar.86 World
Wildlife Fund currently has plans to convert the remaining $900,000 (under
the $3 million ceiling) over the next two years.87 AID will cover hard cur-
rency expenditures in the amount of $300,000 associated with the
transaction. 88
Proceeds from this transaction will fund conservation projects over a
three-year period in Madagascar's high priority protected areas and to train,
82. World Wildlife Fund, News Release, WWF & Madagascar Announce First Debt-for-
Nature Swap in Africa, at 1l(Aug. 3, 1989) [hereinafter WWF News Release Madagascar]
(available from World Wildlife Fund, Washington, D.C.); see also DfN Exchange, supra note
26, at 17. World Wildlife Fund reported that Madagascar had previously (Apr. 1989) been the
beneficiary of a S1.6 million debi donation by Deutsche Bank via World Wildlife Fund. World
Wide Fund for Nature, Press Release, WWF in U.S. $2.27 Million Debt-for-Nature.Swap with
Zambia, at 2 n.2 (Aug. 15, 1989) (available from World Wildlife Fund, Washington, D.C.).
83. WWF News Release Madagascar, supra note 82, at 3.
84. Id. at 1. AID is the primary U.S. government agency providing foreign aid assistance
to DCs. AID's role to date has been limited to educational activities, i.e. sponsoring seminars
for debt holders and nonprofit organizations interested in engaging in such transactions, and
providing financial support to a coalition of nonprofit organizations engaged in activities pro-
moting such transactions. DIN Exchange, supra note 26, at 34-35. The ability of AID to par-
ticipate in such exchanges was achieved by the enactment of the International Development
and Finance Act, (see supra note 25). This Act allows AID grant recipients to use such monies
for debt-for-nature transactions, to retain the interest generated from the proceeds of such
exchanges and to use the proceeds to finance approved conservation programs. Id. at 36-37. In
apparent anticipation of such authorization, AID had earlier issued "Debt-for-Development
Guidelines" on February 15, 1989, contemplating a limited number of grants "to assist organi-
zations to develop proposals for debt exchanges that will 'achieve foreign assistance pur-
poses.'" Id. at 35 & n. 21.
85. The commercial banks include: Bankers Trust Company; National Westminster
Bank, PLC; Dresdner Bank; Amro Bank; Banque de l'Union Europeene; Credit Commercial
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equip and support four hundred park rangers.89 A recent study of the is-
land's protected areas (home to a vast array of unique plant and animal
species) revealed that all were threatened by rapid deforestation due to slash-
and-bum cultivation, illegal logging, poaching, drainage of wetlands or over-
grazing by cattle and goats. 90
6. Zambia / World Wildlife Fund
On August 15, 1989, Dr. Henner Ehringhaus, Deputy Director of World
Wildlife Fund International, announced the signing of a $2.27 million debt-
for-nature swap with the Central Bank of Zambia, the second in Africa.91
World Wildlife Fund has been active in Zambia since 1962.92 In addition,
this swap is the first transaction involving European funds and arranged by a
European bank - NMB Bank of The Netherlands.93
World Wildlife Fund is purchasing the total debt for approximately
$470,000, a discount of eighty percent.94 Over half the purchase price came
from an anonymous Swiss donor who had specifically requested that the
money be used for debt-for-nature swaps in Africa.95
II. WHITHER DEBT-FOR NATURE SWAPS?
A recent article, co-authored by attorney Bruce Rich of the Environmen-
tal Defense Fund, states that "[c]learly, debt-for-nature swaps, no matter
how successful, are not an answer to international debt," noting that Conser-
vation International's debt swap "reduced Bolivia's $4.1 billion external debt
by only $650,000. '' 96 Rich further stated, however, that such transactions
offer a unique opportunity to induce DCs to "shift priorities" and emphasize
resource management and conservation. 97 Obviously, therein lies the crux
of debt-for-nature transactions. Will the unique opportunity these transac-
tions offer in terms of resource conservation accompanied by only minimal
debt relief be enough of an inducement for DCs to use such transactions at a
time of growing international tension due to the mounting debt crisis which
89. WWF News Release Madagascar, supra note 82, at 3; DfN Exchange, supra note 26,
at 17.
90. World Wildlife Fund, Madagascar Fact Sheet, at 2 (Aug. 1989) (available from World
Wildlife Fund, Washington, D.C.).
91. World Wide Fund for Nature, Press Release, WWF in US. $2.27 Million Debt-for-
Nature Swap with Zambia, at 1 (Aug. 15, 1989).
92. Id. at 2.
93. Id. at 1.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Aufderheide & Rich, supra note 5, at 320.
97. Id.
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they face? It is a question that is not easy to answer. Examining the salient
advantages and disadvantages and limits of debt-for-nature transactions will
shed some light on possible answers.
Assuming that an appropriate debt instrument can be obtained and that
the various interests of the parties, (i.e., the ECOs, the banks, and the debtor
DC) involved in a debt-for-nature swap can be reconciled,98 one of the most
important limitations in concluding a successful transaction would seem to
be the presence of an effective partner ECO in the debtor DC. The success-
ful agreements concluded to date have taken place in DCs where there were
longstanding relations between the initiating or sponsoring ECO, such as
The Nature Conservancy or World Wildlife Fund, and the debtor DC part-
ner ECO.9 9 Indeed, one expert has warned that debt donations for DCs
"where no effective conservation organizations exist need to be viewed with
extreme caution,"'" as the primary issue is ensuring proper use of the funds
once relinquished."'
Ensuring proper use is complicated in transactions involving agreements
with a sovereign government.10 2 On the one hand, without enforcement
mechanisms, continued adherence to the agreement appears to rest on the
DC's perception of how damaging failure to implement the agreement would
be to its economic and political status.10 3 On the other hand, the agreements
are the product of mutual negotiations, the "swap" concerns control of local
currency not land, and the funds remain wholly in the DC for use by local
ECOs for the conservation and sustainable development of "national" natu-
ral resources, such as parks, forests or wetlands.1" Such an agreement
would seemingly provide a large measure of security, trust and accountabil-
ity, given the DC's vested interest in the implementation of the
agreement. 105
98. For a more in depth analysis of the various interests of the actors at stake in a debt-
for-nature swap see von Moltke, supra note 13; see also Hansen, supra note 11.
99. See Debt-for-Nature Agreement, supra notes 31, 33, 35, 38, 39, 41, 42, and 44.
100. von Moltke, supra note 13, at 2.
101. Id. at 5.
102. Hansen, supra note 11, at 83.
103. Id. Hansen suggests that a debt-for-nature swap take the form of compensation that
can be stopped if the agreement is not strictly adhered to, e.g., annual or periodic compensa-
tion payments to force the country to abide by rather than breach the agreement. It has also
been suggested that bilateral and multilateral governmental institutions be required to consider
the DC's observance of its debt-for-nature transactions prior to granting foreign aid. DIN
Exchange, supra note 26, at 28.
104. Debt for Trees, supra note 4, at 3-4.
105. Id. See also Df/N Exchange, supra note 26, at 29 (concludes that such "transactions
are neither less nor more inherently vulnerable.., than any other conservation investment in a
foreign country, unless the ... exchange requires a long-term financial commitment on the
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A more difficult question is "whether debt-for-nature swaps contribute
significantly to the stabilization" of DC external debt. In those DCs where
such transactions have taken place to date, the total volume of debt-for-na-
ture swaps is relatively small in comparison to the principal amount of
debt.' 0 6 One expert has argued that such transactions relative to annual in-
terest payments on the principal appear more important. Even more signifi-
cant, the expert contends, is the comparison of such transactions as against
the effective annual rise in principal attributable to a country's inability to
service its debt.'° 7 Most DCs are in fact making partial interest payments,
the balance in practice being added to the principal. Since virtually no new
real loans are being made, a DC's debt situation could be considered stabi-
lized when interest payments are not causing an increase in indebtedness.'18
Thus, when measured against this standard, debt-for-nature swaps "indeed
make a noticeable contribution towards a more viable [DC] debt situa-
tion."' Debt-for-nature swaps have, however, taken place only in those
DCs labeled by the World Bank as "heavily indebted""' and/or only in
those DCs whose debts are heavily discounted in the international secondary
debt market."' Obviously, such countries are attractive to ECOs because of
their limited budgets." 2
DCs must also resolve the question of whether debt-for-nature transac-
tions and their resulting programs represent an unnecessary intrusion on
their sovereign rights, a form of "eco-imperialism."' 3 Critics of these debt-
for-nature transactions have charged that these swaps "undermine the sover-
[part of the] government," and then it becomes subject to the vicissitudes of political change).
Id.
106. von Moltke, supra note 13, at 3-4; see also Aufderheide & Rich, supra note 5, at 320.
107. von Moltke, supra note 13, at 3.
108. Id. at 3-4.
109. Id. at 4.
110. THE WORLD BANK, 1989 ANNUAL REPORT 25 (Table 2-3). The "heavily indebted"
countries include Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cote d'Ivoire, Ecua-
dor, Jamaica, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Peru, Philippines, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Yugo-
slavia. Id.
I ll. "As of December 1987, Bolivian debt was selling at between 8 and 10% of face value,
Peru between 5 and 7%, Costa Rica 20 to 22%, Zambia 17 to 19%, and Nigeria 25 to 27%.
The major economies of Brazil and Mexico... are not perceived to be such bad risks, as their
debt is selling at around 42% and 52% respectively." Debt for Trees, supra note 4, at 2.
112. ECOs, because of limited budgets, are drawn to DCs "whose debt sells at large dis-
counts in order to make the most of their contributions." Trouble in Paradise, 2 SWAPS 9
(Nov. 1988). Michael Sweatman of the World Resources Institute, has stated that ECOs
" 'tend to concentrate on countries where there is more leverage and more value for your
dollar.'" Id.
113. Bramble, Third World Debt and Natural Resource Conservation: Tragedy and Oppor-
tunity, June 15, 1989, at 6 [hereinafter Tragedy & Opportunity] (available from National Wild-
life Federation, Washington, D.C.).
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eignty of a debtor country insofar as they require the debtor country to com-
mit local resources that otherwise would not be allocated to the designated
purpose of the exchange." '114 Recently, this issue has been pushed to the
forefront due to international criticism of Brazil and its environmental ef-
forts, or lack thereof, in the Amazon."' 5 President Jose Sarney rather force-
fully rejected the idea of debt-for-nature swaps in Brazil, stating that such
"conditional" aid was unacceptable because restrictions on Brazil's use of
the resources of the Amazon would only abet "that most abject of all pollu-
tions, the pollution of poverty. '  Sarney noted that "[t]he Amazon is ours
... [a]fter all, it is situated in our territory."'1 17 Even a-prominent Brazilian
environmentalist stated that debt-for-nature arrangements "will not be ac-
cepted because of the sovereignty issue," urging nations to donate money to
Brazil's environmental efforts instead.'
18
The sovereignty question is likely to continue to be a barrier to overcome
in DCs, such as Brazil, despite the fact that ECOs do not seek to conserve
capital as a goal per se, but seek to give away money for conservation. 19
Many DCs, in fact, do nof allow significant levels of capital formation in
ECOs and other nonprofit groups, placing them in an advantageous position
to transact debt-for-nature swaps, since the threat of losing capital is not as
likely as in the case of debt-for-equity swaps by commercial investors.
1 20
Moreover, the debt-for-nature swap mechanism requires the debtor DC and
the local beneficiaries "to agree upon the purpose to which the proceeds of
the exchange are being put, therefore ensuring that the investment being fi-
nanced is responsive to both national and local interests."' 21 This amounts
to a "litmus test" of sorts; presumably those transactions that do not com-
port with these interests will not be authorized.
1 22
One other key question is whether banks can be induced to participate
more actively in debt-for-nature swaps. Despite the tax ruling explained ear-
lier, to date only banks holding limited amounts of DC debt are seeking to
dispose of these assets because they find that the uncertainties of valuation
and the complexities of future participation in renegotiating and reschedul-
114. See DfN Exchange, supra note 26, at 12 n. 1.
115. See Linden, Playing With Fire, TIME, Sept. 18, 1989, at 76.
116. Robinson, Brazil Angrily Unveils Plan for the Amazon, Wash. Post, Apr. 7, 1989, at
A1, col. 1. See also Serrill, A Dubious Plan for the Amazon, TIME, Apr. 17, 1989, at 67.
117. Robinson, supra note 116.
118. Id.
119. von Moltke, supra note 13, at 3.
120. Id. See also supra note 20 and accompanying text.
121. See DfN Exchange, supra note 26, at 12 n.1.
122. Id.
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ing such debt outweigh the residual economic benefits of holding the debt.' 1
2 3
Because their debt holdings are small, these banks can dispose of them with-
out undermining their overall financial strength.' 24 Thus, donation of the
debt may prove the most efficient way of disposal by "avoiding the uncer-
tainties of the international secondary debt market and generating some pub-
licity and goodwill."' 25 However, to date, only two banks have donated
debt.' 26 Others have yet to follow.
With regard to tropical deforestation, it has long been recognized that
large-scale deforestation can contribute to regional and global environmental
change and thus affect vital interests of the industrialized countries.' 27 In
fact, tropical rainforests are seen as one of the primary beneficiaries of debt-
for-nature swaps because such transactions can provide vital assistance to
debtor countries who have been forced to cut back on conservation pro-
grams in order to service their debts while simultaneously reducing emis-
sions of greenhouse gases and thereby benefiting all countries. 2 ECOs have
also been pursuing alternatives which have achieved a modicum of suc-
cess,129 such as adding environmental conditions to aid and loans provided
by the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and other multilat-
eral development banks. Few mechanisms, however, have been discovered
that allow creditor countries to protect important natural ecosystems and to
contribute to sustainable management of forest and other natural resources
in debtor DCs.'3 ° Under the right circumstances, debt-for-nature swaps
may prove the most effective means of achieving such ends.
One fear is that debt-for-nature swaps may be a response to a specific
economic situation that may not continue for much longer.' To date, al-
most all such transactions have been consummated by U.S. ECOs, 13 2 the
123. von Moltke, supra note 13, at 3.
124. Id.
125. Id. One Nature Conservancy official believes that the debt restructuring process may
provide a means of raising donations. As part of the negotiations, participating banks would
be asked to donate, as a gesture of good will, a small percentage of the debt for a special "debt-
for-development fund." Trouble in Paradise, 2 SWAPS 10 (Nov. 1988).
126. See supra note 30; see also Fuller & Williamson, supra note 24, at 303.
127. von Moltke, supra note 13, at 4.
128. Wirth, supra note 7, at 17-20; see also Gradwohl & Greenberg, SAVING THE TROPI-
CAL FORESTS 23-53 (1988). One author argues that indeed "the dominating rationale for con-
centrating debt swaps to equity in the form of natural reserves/tropical habitat is the rich
countries' demand for habitat preservation and their concern for the global commons." Han-
sen, supra note 11, at 88.
129. See Aufderheide & Rich, supra note 5; Debt Crisis, supra note 4.
130. See Cartwright, Conserving Nature, Decreasing Debt, 11 THIRD WORLD Q. 114-27
(Apr. 1989).
131. von Moltke, supra note 13, at 5.
132. But see supra note 40.
Debt-for-Nature Swaps
majority with Latin American countries. Negotiations have been initiated
with Peru, Jamaica and Brazil.' 3 Certain U.S. ECOs believe great potential
exists for such swaps in Africa, beyond those concluded in Madagascar and
Zambia. They concede, however, that they might have to be differently
structured since most African debt, over seventy percent, is owed to govern-
ments and public lending institutions, such as the World Bank and other
multilateral institutions, and the possibilities of debt swaps involving such
public held debt is unknown.1 34 Certainly the multilateral development
banks could potentially play a critical role in facilitating such exchanges
either by allowing debt owed to them to be used, although critics have
pointed out that such activity might jeopardize their credit ratings, or by
providing transactional assistance to commercial bank debt-for-nature ex-
changes.135 A long term solution to the debt crisis negotiated by the banks
with the DCs might eliminate the need for such countries to consider debt
relief in the form of such swaps.' 36 On the other hand, if such a solution is
not reached, most debt will be written down to a level that renders it worth-
133. Debt for Trees, supra note 4, at 4.
134. Id. Government lenders and the World Bank "are not in a legal or political position
to redeem debt at a discount," although there is ongoing consideration of debt-for-nature
transaction possibilities using different financial mechanisms. European banks have also con-
sulted World Wildlife Fund concerning the possibility of using outstanding loans in developing
countries and Eastern Europe for conservation purposes. WORLD WILDLIFE FUND LETTER,
supra note 14, at 7. There have also been numerous proposals for the creation of a new inter-
national debt reduction facility, affiliated or in some way associated with the World Bank. See
Debt Reduction OK, But How Much?, 16 DEV. FORUM (July-Aug. 1989) (available from the
World Bank, Washington, D.C.); Speth, Bargaining for the Future: Debt Relief and Climate
Protection (Jan. 1989) (available from World Resources Institute, Washington, D.C.); Bramble
& Millikan, External Debt, Democratization, and Natural Resources in Developing Countries:
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less for the purposes of a debt-for-nature swap.
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CONCLUSION
It is clear that there are many factors working against debt-for-nature
transactions as either long-term solutions to the DC debt crisis or as a mech-
anism to achieve significant conservation of resources or sustainable develop-
ment in a large number of the DCs. 3  They are products of complex
negotiations requiring a confluence of factors that has occurred in only a few
countries. Those countries are unique to some extent in that they are either
members of the "heavily indebted" group or possess not only longstanding
political ties with the U.S. but also longstanding ties between U.S. and
debtor DC ECOs. Moreover, much of the debt of these countries is held by
private lending institutions and despite the presence of a favorable tax ruling
in the U.S., only two banks have donated debt so far. Thus, additional "new
source" dollars for conservation have not been realized.
If these transactions are viewed modestly, however, as augmenting cur-
rently insufficient debtor DC investments in natural resource conservation
and sustainable development, they are achieving what had heretofore been
deemed impossible to achieve. In addition, debt-for-nature swaps have fo-
cused attention on the steadily depleting resource base of the debtor DCs, in
particular tropical rainforest resources, which have been, in recent .years, the
focus of increasing global concern. At the same time, such transactions have
strengthened ties between ECOs in the respective countries and provided
these organizations with new leverage and expertise in political and eco-
nomic venues which they previously did not possess. "9 Likewise, debt-for-
nature swaps have played an important role in involving the business and
banking communities in conservation. Moreover, these transactions have af-
fected the lives of local communities and indigenous peoples within the
debtor DCs, providing them with new jobs, a market for new products, in
137. von Moltke, supra note 13, at 5.
138. See Burand & Barton, Debt-for-Nature Swaps Are Counterproductive, 17 DEv. FORUM
12-13 (July-Aug. 1989).
139. Indeed, Barbara Bramble of the National Wildlife Federation has stated that:
one of the chief goals of debt-for-nature swaps is to fortify local conservation groups:
'The local groups learn how to talk to their government in financial terms and if it is
a debt-for-nature-bonds arrangement, the local money ends up in accounts which
benefit these local groups, giving them stability, financial security, and experience
managing projects.'
Trouble in Paradise, 2 SWAPS 9 (Nov. 1988). According to Ms. Bramble, "the role of U.S.
nonprofit organizations should be minimal. They can act as a conduit of funds donated by
banks, they can provide assistance to local groups in negotiating with the central banks, and
they can help develop conservation projects and ... accounting standards." Id.
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some cases land rights, and with income that will work to sustain these
achievements. Perhaps most importantly, they have provided a model for
financial institutions and ECOs to emulate in finding even more innovative
solutions in addressing positively and fairly the problems of debt and re-
source depletion in order to achieve the admirable objective of sustainable
development.
Robert M. Sadler

